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TAPCHA is a universal CAPTCHA scheme designed for touch-enabled smart devices such as 
smartphones, tablets and smartwatches. The main difference between TAPCHA and other 
CAPTCHA schemes is that TAPCHA retains its security by making the CAPTCHA test ‘invisible’ for 
the bot. It then utilises context effects to maintain the readability of the instruction for human users 
which eventually guarantees the usability of the scheme. Two reference designs, namely TAPCHA 
SHAPE & SHADE and TAPCHA MULTI are developed to demonstrate the use of this scheme. 
CAPTCHAs. Smart devices. Smartphones. TAPCHA. Usability. Security. Context effect. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing 
Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) are a 
popular security mechanism used to make sure 
only human users are able to use the protected 
online services not the bots. They are considered 
as a type of challenge-response authentications 
where human interactive proofs (HIPs) are needed 
for distinguishing humans and computers (Chew & 
Baird 2003, Chellapilla et al. 2005).  
Current mainstream CAPTCHAs are text-based 
CAPTCHAs. In these schemes, online users are 
often required to recognise distorted characters 
presented in an image or video clip. However, in 
order to maintain sufficient security level, 
recognising distorted characters successfully has 
become increasingly difficult (Yan et al. 2008, 
Bursztein et al. 2010). This gets even worse on 
mobile devices due to the limited display size and 
the shift of using keyboards to touch gestures (Lin 
et al. 2011, Shirali-Shahreza et al. 2013, Wismer et 
al. 2012). 
New interactive CAPTCHA schemes have been 
proposed to tackle these challenges on mobile 
devices such as μcaptcha (Leiva & Alvaro 2015) 
and What’s up CAPTCHA (Gossweiler et al. 2009). 
These schemes rely on identifying appropriate 
challenges and required interactions which are 
human friendly and bot resistant. 
In this paper, we present TAPCHA, a universal 
CAPTCHA scheme where its security is retained 
through making the challenges ‘undiscoverable’ 
from a bot. Unlike the existing ones which focus on 
making the challenges ‘hard to complete’ yet 
‘discoverable’ by the bots, our scheme provides 
flexibility in designing the challenges and deciding 
the interaction methods. We achieve this by 
processing the challenge description similar 
methods seen in present text-based CAPTCHAs to 
make it hard for a bot to recognise and understand. 
2. HOW TO ‘HIDE’ CHALLENGE DESCRIPTION 
Consider some attempts to make text-based 
CAPTCHAs more secure (Alsuhibany 2011, Baird 
& Riopka 2005, Bursztein et al. 2011, El Ahmad et 
al. 2012). Similar approaches can be taken to make 
the challenge description hard to be recognised by 
a bot. Unlike computer bots, human users can 
benefit from the context effects (McClelland & 
Rumelhart 1981). This means as long as adequate 
information cues are present within the whole 
challenge (description and presentation), human 
users can still figure out what the challenge is 
about. Figure 1 shows an example where most 
words in the challenge description are distorted 
such as “move”, “from”, “left”, “touch” and “is” etc. 
When more contexts are given, the challenge will 
become more understandable by human users. 
The benefits are obvious. First, it provides flexibility 
in designing challenges and deciding suitable 
interaction methods for the end devices without 
limiting itself to certain types of challenges and 
interaction methods. For example, a test could be 
moving specific objects around, tapping specific 
objects in order or even drawing a specific shape 
on the screen. Second, although the security of the 
scheme is mainly retained through the processed 
challenge description, it can be further reinforced 
through the challenge itself. For example, in an 
object moving challenge, more objects and 
subtests can be introduced to further reduce the 
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mathematical probability to compromise the 
challenge without significantly increase the 
complexity of the test. 
 
Figure 1: Processed instruction with different levels of context provided (left: no context, middle: context level 1, right: 
context level 2) 
3. TAPCHA SHAPE & SHADE 
3.1 Design 
TAPCHA Shape & Shade features ‘swipe’ based 
challenges that ask the user to move a specific 
object from the left side of the canvas to touch 
another specific object on the right side of the 
canvas. The specificity of the object is determined 
by its shape and/or shade. The challenge 
description is mainly processed by using high 
strength waveform transformation with anti-bot 
segmentation adjustment. Figure 2 shows an 
example where a user is required to move the 
lightest object from the left (i.e., round) to touch the 
triangle on the right. 
 
Figure 2: TAPCHA Shape & Shade demonstration 
For added security, the challenge description 
features randomly generated keywords with similar 
meanings and random sentence structures using 
the following construction:  
Action {1…n}, (Direction) (Specificity) Object | 
Object (Specificity) (Direction), Action {a…z}, 
(Direction) (Specificity) Object | Object (Specificity) 
(Direction). 
For example, the same challenge could be given a 
description of “Move the square object from left to 
touch the right object which is the lightest” or “Drag 
the left square object to touch the right round 
object”. 
3.2 Security 
The mathematical probability to compromise 
TAPCHA Shape & Shade is determined by the 
number of objects presented in the test. Taking the 
example shown in Figure 2, the probability will be 
1/(6*5) = 3.33% (Jiang & Dogan 2015). 
The OCR test on the challenge description using 
Google Cloud Vision API shows the average 
success rate of instruction text recognition is: 
23.5%. 
4. TAPCHA MULTI 
4.1 Design 
TAPCHA Multi features similar swipe based 
challenges to TAPCHA Shape & Shade. The 
differences are: (1) the specificity of objects is now 
determined by its shape and colour and (2) the 
user needs to swipe more than once based on the 
challenge description. Figure 3 shows an example 
where a user is asked to (1) place the round object 
from the left over the triangle on the right and (2) 
place the star from the right over the orange object 
on the left. 
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Figure 3: TAPCHA Multi demonstration 
4.2 Security 
The mathematical probability to compromise 
TAPCHA Multi is determined by the number of 
objects presented in the test. Taking the example 
shown in Figure 3, the probability will be 1/(8x7)^2 
= 0.03%. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented TAPCHA, a universal 
CAPTCHA scheme designed for touch enabled 
smart devices including smartphones, tablets and 
smartbands. TAPCHA is different from other 
approaches as it tries to ‘hide’ a challenge from 
computer bots by processing the challenge 
description to make it unrecognisable by them. This 
is achieved through using similar methods noted in 
some text based CAPTCHA schemes. At the same 
time, as human users can benefit from the context 
effects, with adequate information cues presented 
within the whole challenge, they can still 
understand the challenge and complete it. The 
benefit is twofold. First, it provides flexibility in 
designing challenges and deciding suitable 
interaction methods for the end devices. Second, 
although the security of TAPCHA is mainly retained 
through the processed challenge description, it can 
be further reinforced through the challenge itself. 
To demonstrate how TAPCHA can be used in real 
world, TAPCHA Shape & Shade and TAPCHA 
Multi are developed. Our next step is to test 
TAPCHA using the two demos developed with real 
users to further understand its usability. 
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